The Exit Strategy Was Apparently “Try Yemen Again”

Reuters reports Saudi air support for a Yemeni counter-offensive around Bab el-Mandeb and Mocha. The sales pitch: push the Houthis away from the shipping route and keep Saudi oil moving while Hormuz remains constrained by the U.S.-Iran war.^[6][7]

Splendid. One chokepoint catches fire, so the region reactivates a war beside the other one.

Reuters’ October 2 planning report described options ranging from a coastal offensive to attacks on multiple fronts, using Yemeni ground forces under Saudi air cover. Officials linked the planned operation to Saudi leverage in negotiations, while divisions among anti-Houthi forces complicated the picture. The October 7 report describes the counter-offensive already underway.^[6][7]

Yemen’s Transport Ministry said Houthi missiles and explosive drones struck Aden International Airport. The ministry said one missile landed near the runway before a Cairo flight’s scheduled arrival and that the aircraft was diverted to Jeddah. The Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted missiles near Riyadh and Khamis Mushait. An earlier Reuters report carried Houthi claims about King Khalid and Abha airports, which Saudi authorities had not confirmed at that point.^[6]

On October 7, Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation authorities reported three people killed and 36 wounded in attacks on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and Abha airport. The attacks occurred on October 6 and 7; the statement did not identify which airport was attacked on which day. Late on October 7, the Saudi-led coalition said it had attacked more than 80 Houthi military sites across Saada, Hodeidah, Jawf and Marib.^[12]

Fact and inference

Reuters reports Saudi air support and a counter-offensive; Yemen’s Transport Ministry reported the Aden airport attack, while the coalition reported missile interceptions. On October 7, IOM reported more than 200,000 people displaced in the latest fighting and said Yemen’s humanitarian response plan was only 20% funded.^[6][8]

The inference is that this campaign is less an exit strategy than traffic management with fighter jets. Riyadh cannot comfortably negotiate while the Houthis control the southern gate of the Red Sea, especially when the usual Gulf route is already compromised. Retaking the coast may restore leverage. It does not settle Yemen or unify the government camp.^[7]

Reuters, citing a U.S. official, reported that Saudi Arabia had asked Syria to send forces to fight the Houthis. A U.S. official and a Syrian military official told Reuters that Damascus was considering defensive assistance for Saudi Arabia or an offensive deployment. The report did not announce a deployment decision. Nothing says “exit strategy” like reopening the same war and shopping for fresh troops.^[10][11]

Another “limited” war has discovered unlimited terrain, unlimited grudges and a very finite humanitarian budget. The generals have their map. Civilians get the invoice.