CFR maps three ways Europe could defend itself as U.S. protection becomes conditional. The nastiest scenario is institutional taxidermy: the alliance remains technically alive while the machinery stops.
AI-generated conceptual editorial illustration. It is not documentary evidence of military deployments, borders or an adopted defense plan.
Three architectures, none complete
Liana Fix and Daniel Fiott lay out three models for Europe after dependable American protection: a more European NATO, an EU defense union, and a durable coalition of willing states that includes Ukraine. Their conclusion is less tidy than the branding. Europe will probably need pieces of all three.[1]
The first option preserves NATO while Europeans assume more conventional responsibility and the United States keeps the nuclear backstop. It offers continuity, but still depends on Washington choosing not to paralyze the institution it nominally leads.[1]
The second builds an EU defense union around Article 42(7), the mutual-assistance clause. The legal promise exists. The command structure, planning machinery, territorial-defense budget and automatic crisis procedures largely do not.[1]
The third relies on a standing coalition of willing European states. It can move faster than consensus institutions, but speed is not the same as endurance. Ad hoc coalitions still need command, logistics, intelligence, industrial capacity and somebody willing to keep the lights on after the summit photo.[1]
The institutional zombie scenario
The report’s sharpest point is that the United States would not need to leave NATO to make it unusable. Washington could exploit consensus rules, control of the supreme command, force planning, budgets, readiness certification and high-end intelligence assets. The treaty survives. The response mechanism gets sand in every gear.[1]
That is a more useful risk model than endless arguments about whether an American president would formally quit. Institutions often fail politely. The flag stays up, the communiqués keep arriving and the capabilities quietly become conditional.
Europe also remains dependent on American strategic enablers: integrated air and missile defense, lift, long-range strike, space, cyber, logistics and intelligence. Buying more shells is necessary. It does not replace the operating system.[1]
Our read
Europe’s defense debate still likes the moral comfort of “burden sharing.” The report shows the actual problem is authority sharing. Washington wants Europe capable enough to spend more and absorb risk, but not so autonomous that American political leverage or defense-industrial market share disappears.[1]
That bargain can work while U.S. support remains credible. It gets strange when the customer is asked to become self-reliant without being allowed to copy the wiring diagram.
The practical answer is redundancy: strengthen the European role inside NATO, make the EU mutual-defense clause operational, and turn coalitions of the willing into durable planning structures. Redundancy is expensive. Discovering in a crisis that one ally controls the fuse box is more expensive.
Caveat: This is scenario analysis, not a forecast. It assumes U.S. disengagement becomes structural and Russia remains Europe’s principal threat. The authors acknowledge that the eventual system will probably combine models. CFR is a U.S. foreign-policy institution, and the report evaluates European choices partly through their consequences for American influence.[1]
FOLLOW THE SOURCES.
Checked Oct 30, 2026. Numbered references point to the evidence behind factual passages. Commentary is our own.
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