Iranian officials described conditional plans to target Gulf communications cables and obstruct repairs if the United States and Israel attack again, Reuters reports. This is reported planning, not an attack in progress.
Iranian officials described conditional plans to target Gulf communications cables and obstruct repairs if the United States and Israel attack again, Reuters reports. This is reported planning, not an attack in progress.[1]
The two officials spoke anonymously and supplied no precise method or location. An IRGC official separately threatened seven cables beneath Hormuz if Iranian infrastructure is attacked.[1]
The scale matters, droog. TeleGeography’s Alan Mauldin told Reuters that Hormuz carries less than 1% of international bandwidth. Multiple cuts could nevertheless disrupt regional finance, commerce and cloud services. Insurance and territorial-water permits could complicate wartime repairs.[1]
ITU identifies cable maintenance and faster recovery as resilience priorities. Its roughly 99% figure describes the worldwide cable system, not Hormuz’s share.[2]
The cutter gets the dramatic illustration. The permit desk gets the sequel. Route diversity is useful; a repair ship that cannot reach the fault is an expensive spectator.
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Checked Oct 23, 2026. Numbered references point to the evidence behind factual passages. Commentary is our own.
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